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it can be supported, but if it be taken to mean that the legislature may limit the time in which the question of constitutionality may be raised, as the court seems to intimate, the decision is questionable.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—VALIDITY OF STATUTORY PRESUMPTION.—The defendant was convicted under a federal statute which provided that the possession of opium should be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction, unless the accused should explain such possession to the satisfaction of the jury. It further provided that on or after July 31, 1913, all smoking opium should be presumed to have been imported after April 1, 1909, on which date the importation of opium was prohibited. The plaintiff assailed the constitutionality of these provisions. *Held,* that the statute was valid. *Ng Choy Fong* v. *United States* (9 C. C. A., 1917) 245 Fed. 305.

The weight of authority sustains the power of the legislature to prescribe rules of evidence, in both civil and criminal cases, *Mobile etc. R. R.* v. *Turnipseed* (1910) 219 U. S. 35, 42, 31 Sup. Ct. 136; *State* v. *Thomas* (1906) 144 Ala. 77, 40 So. 271, since there is no vested right in such rules. *Meadowcroft* v. *People* (1896) 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 303; Cooley, Const. Lim. (7th ed.) 524. This power is, however, subject to certain limitations. No rule of evidence may be enacted, which makes one fact *prima facie* evidence of another, unless there is such a relationship between the fact proved and the fact presumed that the latter may reasonably be inferred from proof of the former; *People* v. *McBride* (1908) 234 Ill. 146, 171, 84 N. E. 865; *Mobile etc. R. R.* v. *Turnipseed, supra*; nor may any presumption be made conclusive, if the party is thereby deprived of his constitutional right to an opportunity for a trial. *Missouri, K. & T. Ry.* v. *Simonson* (1902) 64 Kan. 802, 68 Pac. 653; Cooley, *op. cit.* 526; 2 Columbia Law Rev. 493. The constitutionality of statutes similar to the one in the instant case, providing that upon proof of certain facts criminal intent may be inferred, is now established. *United States* v. *Yee Fing* (D. C. 1915) 222 Fed. 154; *People* v. *Cannon* (1893) 139 N. Y. 32, 34 N. E. 759. It is to be noted that such statutes do not operate to deprive the accused of the so-called presumption of innocence, but merely create a presumption of guilty knowledge, *Board of Comm'rs of Excise etc.* v. *Merchant* (1886) 103 N. Y. 143, 8 N. E. 484; *People* v. *Cannon, supra*; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, § 1354 (3), the effect of which, like that of any true presumption, is merely to shift the burden of going forward with evidence But the prosecution is not thereby released from the burden of establishing its case. *Commonwealth* v. *Williams* (1856) 72 Mass. 1. The principal case, therefore, is sound, inasmuch as the rule of evidence prescribed by the legislature affords the defendant a fair opportunity to submit his defense to the jury.

CONTRACTS—INADEQUACY OF CONSIDERATION—BASTARDS.—In a bastardy proceeding pursuant to statute it appeared that before the commencement of the action the defendant had prevailed upon the plaintiff to accept twenty-five dollars in full satisfaction and discharge of said action. *Held,* that the former contract being founded upon an inadequate consideration was not a bar to the present suit. *Burr* v. *Phares* (W. Va., 1917) 94 S. E. 30.

The rule is well settled that if there be any consideration the court will not inquire into the adequacy of it, *Brooks* v. *Haigh* (1840) 10